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I. INTRODUCTION

Recent advances in the field of neuroscience, especially improved
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) techniques, are providing scientists
and decision-makers with an increasingly complex understanding of how
our brains develop from birth to adulthood. While these studies are still
in their infancy, they have already made it clear that the brain typically
continues to develop long after the point at which an individual becomes
a legal adult (i.e., at age 18), and that the slow maturation process that
plays out in the social context is mirrored by a slow maturation process
at the neural level. Despite the tentative nature and unsettled meaning of
this information (i.e., we do not yet understand the actual link between
brain structure and behavior), neuroscience is increasingly implicated in
long-standing debates about the treatment of juveniles in the criminal
justice system and the extent to which adolescents can be held legally
responsible for their acts.
To date, the most notable example of this trend has been Roper v.
Simmons,1 in which the Supreme Court banned the death penalty for

∗

This is an expanded and modified version of an article which originally appeared as: Jay D.
Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 113 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 115 (2007). Adapted with permission.
1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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offenders under the age of 18.2 The case revolved around the trial,
sentencing, and habeas corpus petition of Christopher Simmons, who
brutally murdered an elderly woman during the course of a burglary
when he was 17 years old.3 The Court held that although the execution
of juveniles was once considered acceptable in American society, a
national consensus had emerged that such a punishment was cruel and
unusual and, thus, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.4 The majority
agreed with Simmons’ claim that adolescents do not possess the
emotional, intellectual, or biological maturity necessary to be reliably
classified among the worst offenders.5 Although adolescents should
certainly be punished for their crimes, they should not pay the ultimate
price for impulses that they were unable to control.6 Simmons’
argument was premised largely on new brain imaging evidence
suggesting that the adolescent brain is not as well developed as the adult
brain.7
The shortcomings of the teen brain have been showcased in the
mainstream media as an explanation for violent and inappropriate
adolescent behavior at least since the 1999 Columbine High School
shootings.8 In the last decade, newspapers, and mass-market weeklies
have promised to “revolutioniz[e] our view of the adolescent mind—and

2. Id. at 570-71.
3. Id. at 556.
4. Id. at 564, 568.
5. Id. at 568-70.
6. See id. at 573-74.
7. Brief of Respondent at 20, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633),
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmons/partybrief.pdf [hereinafter Simmons’
Brief].
8. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, Getting Inside a Teen Brain, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 58;
Shannon Brownlee et al., Inside the Teen Brain, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 9, 1999, at 44;
Duncan Graham-Rowe, Teen Angst Rooted in Busy Brain, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 19, 2002, at 16;
Roberta Hotinski, You Were Angry?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 9, 1999, at 50; Claudia
Wallis & Kristina Dell, What Makes Teens Tick? A Flood of Hormones, Sure. But Also a Host of
Structural Changes in the Brain. Can Those Explain the Behaviors that Make Adolescence So
Exciting—and So Exasperating?, TIME, May 10, 2004, at 56; Teen Excesses are Linked to Brain
Growth; New Research Suggests that Hormones Are Not Cause of Adolescent Angst, SAINT LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 31, 2000, at B7; Matt Crenson, Brain Changes Shed Light on Teen Behavior;
Old Theory Shattered by New Technologies; New Information Gained About Brain Development,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 31, 2000, at 18; Fran Henry, Dealing With Your ‘Crazy’ Teens; Bad
Behavior May Not Be Their Fault—or Yours, Psychologist Says, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Dec.
3, 2001, at E1; Curt Suplee, Key Brain Growth Goes on Into Teens; Study Disputes Old
Assumptions, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2000, at A1; Shankar Vedantam, Are Teens Just Wired That
Way?; Researchers Theorize Brain Changes are Linked to Behavior, WASH. POST, June 3, 2001, at
A1.
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explain[ ] its mystifying ways.”9 These accounts argue that while we
once explained teen unpredictability and excessive risk-taking by
invoking “raging hormones” or the need to assert one’s individual
identity through rebellion, we now know that the evolving structure of
the adolescent brain is the true cause.10 As one leading neuroscientist
said in a 2001 op-ed, “[T]o understand what goes wrong in the teenagers
who fire the guns, you have to understand something about the biology
of the teenage brain.”11
Although brain development studies are rarely invoked as a legal
defense (in other words, that “my immature brain made me do it”), they
are increasingly being used by enterprising defense advocates as
evidence that teenagers are not yet adults and that the legal system
should therefore not treat them as such. In one recent case in the District
of Columbia, defense lawyers used brain imaging studies showing that
the brain is not fully developed until well into the third decade of life to
suggest that a 19-year old male (who also showed clear signs of mental
retardation) could not be held fully responsible for his crimes.12 As
stated in her Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, Public Defender and
juvenile justice advocate Santha Sonenberg wrote:
Although chronologically Mr. W is just barely an adult, his mental age
renders him a juvenile. As discussed more fully infra, ‘since 2000,
numerous brain scan studies have established that the human brain
does not fully mature until an individual is in his or her early to midtwenties.’ [citation omitted] Thus, even without his serious cognitive
deficits, at nineteen, his brain was not that of an adult.13

In another D.C. case, involving a high school junior named Gary
Durant, who was charged with murder as an adult for a crime he
committed at the age of 17, Sonenberg is hoping to use brain imaging
studies to have him returned to the juvenile justice system where she
feels he belongs.14

9. TIME, May 10, 2004, at Cover.
10. Begley, supra note 8, at 58.
11. Daniel R. Weinberger, A Brain Too Young for Good Judgment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2001, at A13.
12. United States v. Kurt W., (D.C. Super. Ct. 2005) (Juvenile Criminal Case Under Seal).
13. Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, United States v. Kurt W., at 7 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2005),
available
at
http://www.pdsdc.org/calendar/summerseries/ss07252006/Sample%20
Memorandum%20in%20Aid%20of%20Sentencing.pdf.
14. Laura Sessions Stepp, He’s a Man, as Charged; but Should Emerging Brain Science
Affect Courts’ Handling of Young Defendants?, WASH. POST, May 6, 2008, at HE1.
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In Roper v. Simmons, Christopher Simmons’ legal team and its
supporters (including the American Medical Association and the
American Psychological Association) contended that the biological
limitations rendered the death penalty a cruel and unusual punishment
because teens do not have the brain structure necessary to fully control
their actions.15 The use of scientific evidence in Roper was interesting
because brain images were not used to make gross pathologies of the
brain visible, which is how neuroscience has traditionally been invoked
in the criminal justice system over the past two decades (for example, in
the case of John Hinkley).16 Rather, the Simmons defense team sought
to narrow the legal category of culpability by constructing a model of a
normal, mature adult brain that was capable of supporting the functions
of a reasonable man and contrasting that model with the developmental
chaos of a teenager’s brain.17 They sought to have both anatomical and
cognitive normalcy and pathology defined by age rather than by some
diagnosable medical condition or mental state.18 In other words,
Simmons’ legal team argued that, as a population, adolescents’ brain
structure and function have not yet matured to the level found in a
normal population of adults.19 Thus, Simmons sought to extend
categorical exemptions to a group that had no obvious psychiatric
diagnosis or medical problem.
An analysis of the scientific and legal arguments made in Roper is
crucial because juvenile justice advocates are currently seeking to
expand the scope of that decision and to use neuro-scientific evidence
for a variety of non-death penalty related issues.20 In a recent fact sheet
entitled “Adolescent Brain Development: A Critical Factor in Juvenile

15. Simmons’ Brief, supra note 7, at 9-10; Brief for the American Psychological Association
and the Missouri Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/
simmons/apa.pdf; Brief for the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 2, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmons/ama.pdf [hereinafter AMA et al. Amici Curiae
Brief].
16. Jennifer Kulynych, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (1997).
17. Simmons’ Brief, supra note 7, at 20-24.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, APPLYING RESEARCH TO PRACTICE: WHAT ARE
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE? (2007),
http://www.issuelab.org/click/download2/applying_research_to_practice_what_are_the_implication
s_of_adolescent_brain_development_for_juvenile_justice/resource_138.pdf (providing an explicit
statement of the normative value of this strategy).
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Justice Reform,” the non-governmental organization Physicians for
Human Rights proclaimed that “[h]ealth professionals can apply
scientific findings regarding adolescent development to support
advocacy campaigns on” a wide range of issues, including: raising the
age of jurisdiction to be tried as an adult; limiting juvenile transfer to the
adult criminal justice system; supporting clemency and reduced
sentences for juvenile offenders who have already been tried and
convicted as adults; and, finally, creating developmentally appropriate
rehabilitation programs that take into account the physical and mental
state of juveniles.21
Some pioneering juvenile justice advocates are also using this new
evidence as the basis for a redefinition of culpability in criminal law. As
one advocate, Simmie Baer, has argued, the reasonable man standard is
no longer adequate for teens in light of “old soft and new hard”
science.22 Instead, a new standard of the “reasonable adolescent” should
be created on the basis of the scientific and sociological understanding
of teen brain anatomy and behavior.23 In Baer’s view, the new “hard
science” produced by brain imaging would make such a move much
easier. Finally, she argues that on the basis of the new brain imaging
data, the legal system should consider adolescents to be in a “natural
state” of diminished capacity and should treat them as such.24
II. THE SCIENCE OF BRAIN DEVELOPMENT
So what does the science of brain development have to say about
violent and impulsive behavior in adolescents? The evidence, as we
shall see, is rather ambiguous and experts cannot yet come to a
consensus about what it means. There is widespread agreement that
adolescents’ level of intelligence and ability to reason are generally
indistinguishable from adults by the age of 16, at least under ideal
conditions (psychologists call this “cold cognition”).25 However, as
21. Physicians for Human Rights, Adolescent Brain Development: A Critical Factor in
Juvenile
Justice
Reform,
available
at
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/juvenilejustice/factsheets/braindev.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
22. Simmie Baer, Teleconference at the American Bar Association Center for Continuing
Legal Education: Roper v. Simmons: How Will this Case Change Practice in the Courtroom? (June
22, 2005).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE, LESS GUILTY BY REASON OF ADOLESCENCE 2 (2006),
http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue_brief_3.pdf [hereinafter MACARTHUR REPORT]. See also
Florin Dolcos & Gregory McCarthy, Brain Systems Mediating Cognitive Interference by Emotional
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numerous psychosocial studies have demonstrated, adolescents are much
less capable of making sound decisions under stressful conditions or
when peer pressure is strong (otherwise known as “hot cognition”).26
Some researchers have referred to the years when cold cognition and hot
cognition are not aligned as the “immaturity gap.”27 They have argued
that this should be considered a mitigating factor when juveniles are
facing criminal prosecution and that adolescents should not be tried in
traditional adult courts.28
So what causes this gap? For most of the 20th century, experts
believed that the most important period for human brain development
was the first three years of a person’s life.29 The extent to which neural
connections were made during this period would determine future
intelligence and decision-making ability.30 In the past few decades,
however, neuroscientists have discovered that two key developmental
processes, myelination (the disposition of a layer of fatty tissue around
nerve fibers, providing the insulation necessary to efficiently transmit
electrical signals from one neuron to the next)31 and pruning of neural
connections,32 continue to take place during adolescence and well into
adulthood. Pruning is thought to be crucial because individuals are left
with far too many neurons after the massive growth spurt that takes
place in the brain during the first years of life and, again, just before
puberty.33 As the brain matures, certain neural connections are used
more than are others, as individuals learn, gain skills, and progress
through life. Although the mechanism is not fully understood, during
adolescence and into adulthood, the lesser-used connections shrivel
away leaving those that remain more efficient.
Distraction, 26 J. NEUROSCIENCE 2072 (2006) (discussing a scientific study providing evidence of
how emotional distracters detrimentally affect the decision-making process).
26. MACARTHUR REPORT, supra note 25; see Dolcos & McCarthy, supra note 25 (for an
explanation of how emotional distracters stimulate regions of the brain associated with “hot”
emotional processing).
27. See, e.g., MACARTHUR REPORT, supra note 25.
28. Id. at 3.
29. See generally JOHN T. BRUER, THE MYTH OF THE FIRST THREE YEARS: A NEW
UNDERSTANDING OF EARLY BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND LIFELONG LEARNING (1999).
30. Id.
31. See P.R. Huttenlocher, Synaptic Density in Human Frontal Cortex: Developmental
Changes and Effects of Aging, 163 BRAIN RES. 195 (1979); P.R. Huttenlocher et al., Synaptogenesis
in Human Visual Cortex: Evidence for Synapse Elimination during Normal Development, 33
NEUROSCIENCE LETTERS 252 (1982).
32. Paul I. Yakovlev & André-Roch Lecours, The Myelogenetic Cycles of Regional
Maturation of the Brain, in REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRAIN IN EARLY LIFE 3-70
(Alexandre Minkowski ed., 1967).
33. See Huttenlocher, supra note 31.
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As early anatomical studies showed, different parts of the brain
become fully myelinated and pruned at different times, with some
maturing very early in life and some continuing myelination through
many decades of life.34 In both cases, it appeared that the brain regions
responsible for basic life processes and sensory perception tend to
mature fastest, whereas the regions responsible for behavioral inhibition
and control, risk assessment, decision-making, and emotion tend to take
longer to mature.35 Many of these higher order processes are centered in
the frontal lobe. The results of both of these processes can be seen with
modern MRI techniques. The visible result of myelination is an increase
in the amount of white matter found in the brain, whereas the visual
result of pruning is a decrease in the amount of gray matter present in the
brain. Beginning in the late 1990s, researchers at UCLA and NIH
confirmed that these processes continue well into a person’s early
adulthood, thus providing conclusive evidence that the brain of an
adolescent is on average less myelinated and pruned than an adult’s.36 In
one study, UCLA researchers took MRIs of 10 healthy 12-16 year olds
and 10 healthy 23-30 year olds and compared brain structures.37 In
another study at NIH, researchers took MRI images of healthy
individuals at 4 year intervals from ages as young as 4 until ages as old
as 22.38 Although this research team found significant inter-individual
variation in cerebral cortex development among the 145 study
participants, they saw a clear pattern of linear increases in the volume of
white matter found in this region but nonlinear changes in the volume of
gray matter.39 In terms of gray matter volume, they saw a general trend
toward preadolescent increases and postadolescent decreases, with
region-specific changes.40
Building on this work, in 2004, researchers from UCLA and NIH
collaborated and put together a composite time-lapse sequence of brain
development among 13 healthy children whose brains had been scanned

34. See Ruben C. Gur, Brain Maturation and Its Relevance to Understanding Criminal
Culpability of Juveniles, 7 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPORTS 292 (2005) (providing a brief review of
this topic and its relevance to adolescents); see also Staci A. Gruber & Deborah Yurgelun-Todd,
Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OH. ST. J. CRIM. LAW 321 (2006).
35. See Yakovlev & Lecours, supra note 32.
36. See Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in
Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859 (1999); Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain
Development During Childhood: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999).
37. Sowell et al., supra note 36, at 859.
38. Giedd et al., supra note 36, at 861.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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every 2 years for 8–10 years.41 These time-lapse sequences showed that
the regions of the frontal cortex responsible for higher order thinking
and behavior management matured after the regions responsible for
lower order sensory and motor activities, whose function they
integrate.42
Although all of these studies have severe limitations (including
small sample size and sample selection biases, such as an average IQ of
125 for one study), all available evidence seems to suggest that many
important regions of the brain continue to develop through adolescence
and into adulthood. What remains to be determined, however, is the
extent to which these developmental milestones are causally related to
changes in decision-making capacity.
In addition to these structural studies, researchers have also begun
to use functional MRI, which essentially amounts to making a movie of
changes in blood flow in the brain as test subjects are exposed to stimuli
or perform various tasks. Blood flow is taken as a proxy for brain
activity in these images.43 Although fMRI studies are far from scientific
maturity, they played an important role in the debate over the juvenile
death penalty. Of greatest relevance in this context was the work done
by psychologists Abigail A. Baird of Dartmouth University and Deborah
Yurgelun-Todd, who was at Harvard at the time, on the activation of a
brain structure called the amygdala.44 The amygdala is a part of the
limbic system that is known to be involved in interpreting emotion and,
in particular, in determining whether another organism or situation is
threatening.45 Thus, the amygdala is a central component of the brain
system that detects danger and generates fear responses.46
Of particular interest to researchers is the fact that the amygdala
also seems to play a role in the recognition of facial expressions and the
ability to attach emotional meaning to them.47 In a 1999 study, Baird,
Yurgelun-Todd, and colleagues subjected 12 individuals between the
ages of 12 and 17 years to photographs of fearful faces while they were
41. Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development during Childhood
through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8174 (2004).
42. Id.
43. Robert Mathias, The Basics of Brain Imaging, NIDA NOTES., Nov.-Dec. 1996, available
at http://www.nida.nih.gov/NIDA_notes/NNVol11N5/Basics.html.
44. Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect
Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 195
(1999).
45. Joseph LeDoux, The Amygdala, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY at R868, R870 (2007).
46. Id.
47. Id. at R873-74.
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undergoing MRI.48 They found that the amygdala became very active
during facial recognition activities in adolescents.49 In addition, they
found that adolescents were prone to misreading fearful facial
expressions, characterizing them as angry, confused, surprised, and
happy.50
In subsequent work, Yurgelun-Todd and her colleagues at Harvard
examined how the recognition of emotion in facial expressions might
differ in adolescents and adults. In the Brief of the American Medical
Association, et al. As Amici Curiae in Support of Simmons, YurgelunTodd was cited for her research showing that adolescents and adults use
different parts of the brain to identify emotions in facial expressions.51
Specifically, she found that the frontal lobe is much more active in
adults during this process than it is in adolescents, who, as reported
above, rely more heavily on the amygdala.52 In other words, while the
adults relied on the part of the brain that is involved in “planning, goaldirected behavior, judgment, [and] insight,” the adolescents relied on
what she characterizes as “the more emotional region or that gut
response region.”53 Further, Yurgelun-Todd reported that in this pilot
study, adults were much better at recognizing fear in facial expressions.
According to statements she made in an interview for the PBS
documentary series, “Frontline,” adults identified fearful expressions
100% of the time, whereas adolescents chose the correct emotion only
about half the time.54 Thus, according to Yurgelun-Todd, there was
something inherently biological about the way teens reacted to the world
around them. Despite the excitement that this research generated in the
juvenile justice community, however, numerous flaws have been
identified in Yurgelun-Todd’s work—including that the teenagers were
thrown off by the fact that the images were black and white and created

48. Baird et al., supra note 44, at 196.
49. Id. at 197.
50. Id. at 198.
51. AMA et al. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 15, at 15 n.52-53 (citing Interview by Sarah
Spinks with Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Director, Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neuroimaging of
McLean Hospital, broadcasted as Inside the Teenage Brain on FRONTLINE (Airdate 1/31/2002),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/todd.html.).
52. Interview by Sarah Spinks with Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Director, Neuropsychology and
Cognitive Neuroimaging of McLean Hospital, broadcasted as Inside the Teenage Brain on
FRONTLINE (Airdate Jan. 31, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows
/teenbrain/interviews/todd.html.
53. Id.
54. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 8

13-ARONSON_COPYFORPRINTER.DOC

926

4/24/2009 2:43 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[42:917

in the 1970s.55 It is also worth noting that, at least to the best of my
knowledge, the results of this research have never been formally
published in a peer-reviewed journal.
III. THE USE OF BRAIN SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
Returning to the legal side of things, Roper v. Simmons represented
the culmination of a series of juvenile death penalty appeals in which
this brain imaging research was invoked by the defense. In the 2002
case of Commonwealth v. Huertas,56 for example, the defense asked the
judge to bar Pennsylvania from pursuing the death penalty for the
defendant (who was 17 years old when he committed the crime in
question) on the basis of a combination of existing law and new
scientific discoveries about the brain.57 In a brief to the court, the
defense team wrote that, “a growing body of objective factors . . . point
to a ‘modern societal consensus’ that obviates the Stanford Court’s
reluctance to categorically invalidate capital punishment for juvenile
offenders above 15 years of age.”58 Huertas’s legal team noted that the
scientific consensus in the era of Stanford v. Kentucky59 was that brain
development was complete before puberty, and they argued that a
majority of justices on the Stanford court would have found the current
state of knowledge of this process relevant to Eighth Amendment
analysis.60 Although the impact of the scientific evidence is difficult to
ascertain, Huertas did not ultimately receive the death penalty.
In 2002, a similar effort was made to spare the lives of Kevin
Stanford (of Stanford v. Kentucky) and Toronto Patterson, a Texas death
row inmate who was convicted of killing a woman and her two
daughters during the course of a robbery when he was 17 years old. In a
petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, Patterson’s defense team used an
affidavit about brain development by Dr. Ruben Gur as evidence that

55. See Amanda Schaffer, Head Case: Roper v. Simmons Asks How Adolescent and Adult
Brains Differ, SLATE, Oct. 15, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2108284.
56. Commonwealth v. Huertas, No. CP 0009–0941 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2002).
57. Motion to Preclude the Commonwealth from Seeking the Death Penalty Against a
Juvenile and Consolidated Memorandum of Law at 3-4, 37-38, Commonwealth v. Huertas, No. CP
0009–0941 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2002), available at http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org
/pdfs/HUERTASfINALjUVENILEcHALLENGEmOTION.pdf.
58. Id. at 37
59. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled in part by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
60. Motion to Preclude the Commonwealth from Seeking the Death Penalty against a Juvenile
and Consolidated Memorandum of Law, supra note 57, at 38.
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Patterson’s age should preclude him from execution.61 In both cases, the
Supreme Court declined to hear the petition.62 The dissent in In re
Stanford, however, argued that a national consensus against the juvenile
death penalty had emerged since Stanford’s original trial in the late1980s and that recent brain imaging studies “make the case even
stronger that adolescents ‘are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less
self-disciplined than adults.’”63 Although Patterson was executed on
August 28, 2002,64 Stanford’s sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment in 2003 by Kentucky’s governor Paul Patton, a long-time
foe of the juvenile death penalty.65
In deciding in favor of Simmons, the Supreme Court certainly took
notice of the scientific evidence just discussed, but mentioned it only in
passing in the majority opinion.66 Instead, they focused on evidence that
a national consensus seems to have emerged among the states and in
international law that individuals who commit crimes as juveniles should
not be sentenced to death.67 One reason for this situation is that these
developmental studies have not yet been ruled admissible in any court of
law in the country.68
IV. DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE MEANING AND VALUE OF BRAIN
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Such caution on the part of the highest court in the land has not
deterred supporters of juvenile justice reform from hailing neuroscience
as a key component to their long-term strategy to ensure that individuals
under the age of 18 are treated as vulnerable juveniles in the criminal
justice system and not as adults. Many juvenile justice advocates
believe that brain imaging studies provide the hard evidence they need to
finally convince lawmakers and the general public about problems
inherent in treating juveniles as adults in the legal system.
61. Affidavit of Ruben Gur, Petitioner’s expert, Patterson v. Texas, 528 U.S. 826 (1999) (No.
98-8907), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/Gur%20affidavit.pdf (last visited Mar.
12, 2009).
62. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002); Patterson v. Texas, 528 U.S. 826 (1999).
63. In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. See David Carson, Texas Execution Information Center, Information on Toronto Patterson
(Aug. 28, 2002), http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/279.asp.
65. See Death Penalty Information Center, Clemency, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
clemency (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
66. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
67. Id. at 564, 578.
68. See Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 115, 136-37 (2007).
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Yet at the same time, there is nothing even approaching consensus
within the scientific community that these brain imaging studies ought to
guide legal decision-making and public policy in the context of juvenile
justice.69 On one side are psychologists like David Fassler and Ruben
Gur, who believe that preliminary brain imaging evidence is strong
enough to be used by courts to create a categorical exemption for
juvenile offenders.70 Ronald Dahl from the University of Pittsburgh
believes that although the connection between particular anatomical
markers and the act of decision-making will eventually be proven
correct, the evidence is not yet strong enough for widespread use in the
legal system.71
Others, such as Elizabeth Sowell from UCLA and Bradley Peterson
from Columbia University, are uncomfortable with introducing
neuroscientific evidence into the legal system before it is understood
exactly how specific brain traits relate to the real-life decision making
and behavior of teens in high-stress situations.72 They point to our lack
of understanding about when individuals cross the threshold of brain
development that makes it possible to know right from wrong and to
make sound decisions in the heat of the moment—or even whether brain
structure plays a major role in this shift.73 Further, there is also the very
real problem of how to deal with the significant inter-individual
variations that are seen in brain development and also the possibility that
currently unknown brain structures or neural networks might
compensate for delays in the development of particular brain regions.
Finally, some commentators, such as Harvard University
psychologist Jerome Kagan, believe that there is no place for science in
the debate over the death penalty. In their view, capital punishment is an
ethical and moral issue, not a scientific one.74 Further, Kagan points out
that one can only understand brain development in a cultural and
historical context. Although adolescent brains presumably develop at
the same rate around the world, teen violence and murder rates range
from very low to very high, from country to country. Furthermore, in
many other cultures, and until very recently even in Western societies,

69. Bruce Bower, Teen Brains on Trial: The Science of Neural Development Tangles with the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 165 SCI. NEWS 299, 299 (2004).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 301.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 299.
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people functioned as adults at a much earlier age—certainly by age 16—
than they do today.
The fact that there are so many diverse opinions on the role that
neuroscience may play in the way that juveniles are treated in the
criminal justice system suggests that most scientists, lawyers, and
commentators involved in the debate have not quite made up their minds
about why we are turning to science to resolve these questions in the
first place. Is it because neuroscience actually might say something new
and unique about adolescent behavior and decision-making that we don’t
already know? Or because we hope it will resolve problems that we as a
society tend to disagree about? Or is it because advocates of a particular
normative position are hoping to use the cultural authority of science to
achieve their particular view of how the criminal justice system ought to
operate? Or is it because the legal system relies on expertise more
generally to make decisions about complex social problems?
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever the case, it is clear that the use of brain imaging in the
juvenile justice debate suggests that the allure of biological explanations
for criminality continues to appeal to American society and our criminal
justice system. While few people would disagree with continuing efforts
to understand why certain people commit crimes and others do not, we
must not submit to a new kind of biological determinism which posits
that behavior is merely the “calculable [consequence] of an immense
assembly of neurons firing.”75 Violence and criminality, like all human
actions and attributes, are irreducibly complicated products of the
interaction of the biological and the social. The plain and simple truth is
that the vast majority of adolescents do not commit violent crimes and
are able to control their impulses when it matters most. This suggests
that the feedback network between the brain and lived experiences is
incredibly complex—even in teens. Thus, if adolescence were truly a
significant “ongoing ‘condition’ of development”76 (in the sense of a
serious, well-defined, diagnosable medical problem like bipolar
disorder) that seriously impaired decision-making in all individuals all
over the world, we would be in serious trouble. Marauding youths
would be killing each other, their teachers, their elders, and their
parents—and civilization as we know it would probably come to an end.

75. Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693, 693 (2007).
76. Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 34, at 331.
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The fact that it has not, and that when adolescents do commit heinous
crimes it is almost always considered newsworthy, suggest that factors
other than myelination and pruning are equally, if not more important
than biology in determining why some subset of adolescents commit
violent crimes.
While it is indeed possible that teens who commit crimes are on
average biologically different from those who do not, the current state of
neuroscience (which has so far failed to make a conclusive link between
brain structure and adult-like decision-making capacity) leaves us in no
position to make a claim one way or the other. Further, it would be
nearly impossible to determine whether the brain structure present in
criminal adolescents was caused by social and environmental factors
(which are typically considered mitigating in the sentencing phase of
criminal trials) or independent of these non-biological factors. Thus, it
seems that neuroscience does not (at least at present) offer a way out of
the vexing problems at the heart of juvenile justice.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss3/8

14

